Post-Soviet Russian-Western Relations [Part II: German Unification]

The German unification (or, more precisely, reunification) affair was many things to both Gorbachev, on a personal level as the head of state, and Russia. It was not only a mere manifestation of the then new disposition of Soviet Russia to recognize the freedom of other nations to leave the Soviet Union; but, far more importantly still, it was an in practice recognition—a public admission at an international level—of their right to self-determination [emphasis added]. That is to say, it constituted an unprecedented practical shift in the Soviet political paradigm; so much so that Moscow wouldn’t simply refrain from intervening to buttress a communist regime and ensure the preservation of a soviet republic (the most prominent one geopolitically, no less—by virtue of being the farthest westward); it would virtually consent to and practically allow the eradication of that regime and the de-Sovietization of the German Democratic Republic.

 

The question thus remains: insofar that momentous unification signified a grand gesture of embracing the rights of other nations to democratization, on the part of Russia; how did it bring Gorbachev’s political life to an end, and turn out to be a total disappointment—or, ‘stab in the back,’ so to speak—for Russia?

 To put it mildly, Gorbachev had overestimated the enchanting effect of his domestic as well as international actions and policies. Likewise, he miscalculated their capacity to induce reciprocal and commensurate actions on the part of his Western counterparts. In a sense, Gorbachev had hoped then to get compensated for accelerating the actualization of an inevitable eventuality—that Russia would concede in the end. 

But even before Gorbachev rose to power, the Americans knew they had the necessary wherewithals to win the arms race on the financial front, given the strain of time on a dysfunctional Soviet economy. Remembering his time of service on the White House staff in the early 1980s, Stefan Halper recollects:

“When Reagan first took office, I was on the White House staff. I remember a National Security Council meeting at which the service chiefs, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported one by one that the Soviets had overwhelming strength; they had more aircraft, more surface combatants, more submarines, more tanks, more battalions, and so on. With each report, the President said nothing. Eventually, the President turned to his old friend and new CIA director Bill Casey, and asked, “Bill, what do we have more of?” Casey responded, “We have more money.” The President said, “Fine we’ll use that.”” (Fitzgerald & Packwood 45)

 

Having that said, it is altogether intelligible why the Americans and British had provided little tangible support, in terms of economic assistance, to Gorbachev’s policy of perestroika. It would have been counterintuitive to help their rival close the gap in the domain wherein they had a clear advantage. That is why Reagan chose not to grant Gorbachev any moral or tangible consideration beyond the absolutely required minimum [emphasis added]. Nevertheless, history has shown us that that counterintuitive undertaking—embracing the paradox—would have been the right thing to do. As with any business, minimizing expenses does not guarantee per se better return on investment.

On the other hand, Gorbachev could have easily prolonged the Cold War and held off the unification of Germany. Former British Ambassador to the United States and distinguished broadcaster Peter Jay had once asserted, “It is only a mild exaggeration to assert that we know the year, day, and hour when the Cold War ended. It ended on the day, year, and hour when Mikhail Gorbachev told Erich Honecker that he would not send Soviet tanks into the streets of Berlin to save the East German regime. This signaled to the entire world that the end of the Cold War was inevitable, predictable, and obvious, because one side of the war was unilaterally capitulating. The Russians no longer would defend the communist regimes within the Soviet Empire [my formatting].” (Fitzgerald & Packwood 75)

 

For the truth of the matter is this: 

 

Given that, ‘the Soviets had overwhelming strength; they had more aircraft, more surface combatants, more submarines, more tanks, more battalions, and so on,’ according to the reports presented to President Reagan by his Joint Chiefs of Staff; and albeit the woeful economic reality, Gorbachev was far from being helpless militarily. There was plenty he could have done to, not prevent perpetually but, hold-off the German unification. Hence, the argument could be made that his hopes for better settlement conditions were not entirely unwarranted; they were however quixotic, no less.

From my personal perspective, the unification process of Germany was Gorbachev’s political undoing and perceived as ‘stab in the back’  from Russian viewpoint, because it had summoned to the fore of Russian consciousness the status-quo ante of Western-Russian relations that pertained to the Czarist era; which was characterized by the West outwitting Russia and exploiting her efforts. This was to the Soviets a Russian historical wisdom that constituted the compass for Stalin’s post-war foreign policy vis-á-vis the West.

“Well-versed in Russian history and mythology, he expected the ever-tricky West to follow its usual pattern of behavior: use Russians as cannon fodder, lure them to fight with promises of major strategic gains [my formatting], and leave them empty-handed in the end. In Stalin’s words cited by Molotov at the war’s end, “Czarist Russia was used to win wars, but was unable to enjoy the fruits of her victories. Russians are remarkable warriors but they do not know how to make peace [my formatting]. They are deceived and underpaid.” (Fitzgerald & Packwood 21)

 

 

At least in his own judgment, Gorbachev was duped in the German unification process: ““According to the Two-Plus-Four Agreements under which Germany was unified,” he has said, “the United States, Germany, Britain, and France promised us that they would not expand NATO east of Germany.” Yet a careful reading of the agreements that were signed in 1990 when a united Germany joined NATO reveals that NATO enlargement was not explicitly addressed. Gorbachev and his advisors may have with hindsight believed that promises had been made by the Americans [my formatting]. But the historical record shows that no explicit commitments about NATO not enlarging were made—simply because this issue was not on the table. Secretary James Baker had told Gorbachev in February 1990 (before Germany was unified) that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift eastward from its present position, but he was referring to NATO’s jurisdiction over the territory of the GDR, not to NATO’s possible enlargement. In other words, Baker was talking about not stationing NATO troops on the territory of the former East Germany after 1990, not about anything else.” (Stent 37)

 

This confusion/ambiguity had portrayed Gorbachev as the living embodiment of the aforementioned bygone Czarist Russia’s naïveté; and had ipso facto encouraged hardliners in the CPSU to oust him out of power; thus, his political life came to an end. 

 

There can be no question whether or not Gorbachev was deceived. Today, NATO has troops in Poland. Simply put, no pretext, however enticing it may be, can justify this ruse. The Americans had tricked Gorbachev—period. 

 

Notwithstanding, Secretary Baker’s assurances were not the reason the Soviet Union signed the agreements, surely. Gorbachev had his own motives and agenda without a shadow of doubt. He might have thought that the German unification would be perestroika (the political aspect thereof, to be precise) coming to fruition. And it might result not only in ending the Cold War; but in finding a place for Russia in the Collective West [emphasis added]. It is possible that he had reasoned the following: if the common war enemy (i.e. Germany) would be reconciled with and integrated into the West, the path might be then paved for the rapprochement between rivals, which could lead to Russia’s integration into Western structures. 

 

In a nutshell, to both Gorbachev’s and Russia’s disappointment, Germany was embraced and Russia was kept out. Not only was Russia kept out, but to her consternation, it was the one ‘exclusive of Russia alliance,’ or anti-Russia alliance, NATO, that filled up “the void left by the end of the Cold War era when U.S. and Soviet troops had eyed each other over the Fulda Gap that divided East and West Germany,” (Stent 34). This particular moment of NATO victory would continue to poison Russian-Western relations till this very day.

 

 

Related Publications: “Post-Soviet Russian-Western Relations [Part I: Glasnost and Perestroika]”

 

 

Reference

Fitzgerald, Michael R., and Allen Packwood, Out of the Cold: the Cold War and its Legacy. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc., 2013.

Stent, Angela E. The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.