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The Reason I Refrained from Writing on Afghanistan

Ever since the Afghan President fled the country on Sunday August 15th, slightly over couple weeks ago, and the Taliban advanced on the country’s capital, Kabul, seizing the presidential palace; whence it enunciated the establishment of its government; eo ipso ending almost three decades of insurgency; Afghanistan has been all over news and media outlets 24/7. There’s nothing wrong with around the clock news reporting. Quite the contrary. Prompt news reporting is very commendable. But, then, the blame game ensued—which has added a pinch of melodrama to the Afghan platter. To be honest, it was more than a pinch: on a dramatic scale, the recent story on Afghanistan would balance the hysterics one receives from their ex-girlfriend when she calls three months after the break-up while watching “The Notebook.” I, for one, have no stomach for that level of drama. Thank you very much! But, I’m afraid I shall pass. 

 

For the truth of the matter is this:

The political landscape of Afghanistan is very intricate. A vast range of not so easy to determine [to put it mildly] variables is involved at a domestic level. Internationally, the Afghan theater entails, inter alia, residues of Cold War politics; terrorism and counter-terrorism; and geopolitics; global security; even a trait of balance-of-power proxies between and betwixt influential nations of the Islamic World, such as Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan, and others. 

Hitherto, every analysis and reading of any sort has been conducted in a facile manner through the prism of U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan; ipso facto all other complexities have been discarded; turning the Afghan scene in its entirety into a smearing campaign against the United States—namely, against President Biden. I wonder if it has skipped the minds of all those critics and assailants that Joseph Biden is the President of the United States of America, not of Afghanistan [emphasis added]. 

At the end of the day, it is the duty of the President of the United States of America as the Commander in Chief to get U.S.-troops back home, once their mission has concluded. For every mission has a terminal point. It is absolute naïve to have presumed that those troops were there to stay forever. For contrary to what conspiracy theorists would like to believe, the United States does not acquire (i.e. assume ownership of) countries; as it never had; and, most probably never will. It intervenes diplomatically and militarily; restructures the political system and form of government at times; and, engages occasionally in ‘nation-building’ [note: truth be told, which often has tragic consequences, since seldom does it turn out a success]. U.S. missions always have clearly defined scope and objectives. Those by definition have deadlines. 

 

The Americans provided Ghani’s government and forces with every kind of aid that is humanly possible [emphasis added]:

“We spent over a trillion dollars. We trained and equipped an Afghan military force of some 300,000 strong—Incredibly well equipped—a force larger in size than the militaries of many of our NATO allies. We gave them every tool they could need. We paid their salaries, provided for the maintenance of their air force—something the Taliban doesn’t have. Taliban does not have an air force. We provided close air support. We gave them every chance to determine their own future. What we could not provide them was the will to fight for that future [my formatting].

There’s some very brave and capable Afghan special forces units and soldiers, but if Afghanistan is unable to mount any real resistance to the Taliban now, there is no chance that 1 year — 1 more year, 5 more years, or 20 more years of U.S. military boots on the ground would’ve made any difference [my formatting].” (“Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan”)

 

These are facts, not reflections, nor opinions.

 

What did critics expect? President Biden to show up in Kabul and have one of those “once more unto the breach!” moments? For whom? And for what? Why should American troops preserve the footing of a government which its own military lacks the heart and will to defend it?

You can never train someone to have heart or unbreakable will. They either have one, or they don’t. In truth, it was Ghani’s overthrown government’s escape manner that turned the whole situation into a Hollywood theatrics. Perhaps they perceived that as a plausible strategy to keep the Americans in. That is to say, to practically keep Americans hostages to the ‘maintain the peace in Afghanistan’ endless labyrinth. 

How would things develop with the Taliban in government hereafter? I can’t decide, really. All possible scenarios could be equally possible. Simply put, there’s no sufficient data to render an informed and intelligible speculation. 

The Taliban has been underground and living in the wild terrains of Afghanistan for almost three decades. Its survival suggests organizational efficacy, as they managed to keep the finances, arms, and logistical support up and running under such conditions throughout that long period. They had as well concluded successful preliminary negotiations and diplomatic talks with several foreign powers. The main challenge that they are yet to face is: Do they have what it takes to manage the affairs of a population? In other words, do they possess the savoir-faire to run institutions at a country level? 

First and foremost, though: could they remake their public image to portray a representative civil government worthy of the confidence of the Afghan nation? And, in so doing, would the organization be able to maintain its identity, averting rifts at a senior command level vis-á-vis its raison d’être?

 

We would have to wait and see…

 

 

Reference

Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan. 16 Aug. 2021, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/16/remarks-by-president-biden-on-afghanistan/.