In part VI of the “Ukraine Crisis” series, I showcased, though summarily, that the war in Ukraine is the ‘paradigm shift’ of twenty-first century’s international relations and global politics. Notwithstanding, I have also noted that the new paradigm yet retains several features of past eras and the patterns pertaining thereto. Such as middle-powers and client-states aligning with either side of great/super-power conflict. In other theaters across the globe, regional powers are prudently evaluating the current super-powers’ standoff vis-á-vis their own strategic interests; and, are cautiously navigating the raging sea in hope of securing certain considerations from either the West or Russia in return for their alignment with them. The spectrum of this old practice in international politics range from full-fledged alliance to non-alignment.
I shall endeavor, herein, to shed some light on how key (not all: the selection is made on the basis of active-engagement) Middle-Eastern states have been aligning themselves vis-á-vis Russia and the West over the course of the past few weeks, and put it in perspective with respect to the ongoing war in Ukraine. Some have maintained their long-held position; others have completely—though temporarily, I would wager—shifted their alignment (re-aligned); whilst there remain those who oscillate back and forth in reluctance.
Credit: REUTERS)
Starting with Turkey: Once a great power in the pre-WWI world order; now a middle-power and a long-time NATO member (since 1952); the country is a senior and ever active regional power in Middle-Eastern affairs; let alone its strategic geopolitical position (bridging Europe with Asia) and role in NATO-Russian relations. As the apparition of World War mounted the storm clouds gathering over Russia’s relations with Turkey’s Western NATO-allies (namely, the United States), the result of the former’s ongoing Ukraine ‘special military operation’/invasion, Turkey has assumed a mediating role between Russia and Ukraine.
Opting for this ‘balanced-alignment’ of sorts, a course that is both reasonable and prudent for such a seasoned international player, Turkey is perspicuously factoring in its strategic interests in its immediate periphery vis-á-vis its arch-regional-rival Iran alongside neighboring Syria and Iraq—whilst the latter two clearly fall within the first’s sphere of influence. Dispersed amongst this triad and Turkey, a sizable ethnicity of growing force (i.e. the Kurds) is indefatigably aspiring to form their independent state, Kurdistan, that would manifest in a carved-and-patched territories out of Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq. Thus making ‘The Kurdish Question’ a strategic security dilemma that has hitherto intertwined the fate of the territorial integrity of those aforementioned four states.
In Iraq, Uncle Sam may be able to grant Turkey some considerations. But, when it comes to Iran, it is Russia who has some sway with the Iranians—in addition to a preponderant influence over Syria. Having that said, being on good terms with the Russians is elemental with regard to Turkish strategic security and interests.
Israel: Israel has, unsurprisingly, put on the cloak of pure reconciliatory diplomacy (non-alignment, of sorts) with laser-focus on resolving the tensions between the two concerned countries—i.e. Russia and Ukraine—rather than becoming embroiled in vague and convoluted superpowers’ balance-of-power politics. It makes perfect sense for a country like Israel, sharing deep familial and ancestral ties with both Russia and Ukraine, to act as an intermediary—securing the continuity of a minimum level of communication between the two parties.
Moreover, Israel has it own business deals with Russian oligarchs; those it would so very much like to keep. It might as well have had in mind the fact that Russia enjoys a preponderant influence over its neighbor and ‘sworn enemy’, Syria, while gauging the Ukraine crisis.
Iran: With upcoming nuclear-deal talks in focus, Iran seems to oscillate (play in the ‘grey zone’) its alignment. While primarily blaming the U.S. for Ukraine’s woes (Hafezi), Iran’s Supreme Leader had also ‘denounced all wars’—insinuating a subtle reprobation of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine. To what end? Some may wonder…
Seeds of contempt have infiltrated the soil of the cautious and limited [emphasis added] Iranian-Russian regional partnership; which manifested most vividly in the Syrian theater throughout the Syrian civil war; but gradually deteriorated as Russia has grown weary of Iran’s and Iran-affiliates (those shall remain nameless, but I can tell you that they came from neighboring Lebanon) presence in Syria. At the other end of the partnership, Iran is feeling intense insecurity—to say the least—as it monitors with relative unease Russia’s recent rapprochement and multifaceted coordination with Gulf states (namely: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar); its chief contenders for dominance in the Persian Gulf region—those at war with Iran’s proxy Houthi forces in Yemen.
Consequently, Iran seeks to somehow establish implicit rapport with its Western interlocutors in the nuclear-deal talks, reducing its dependence on contingent [emphasis added] Russian support; all the while aiming at retaining that support to the greatest possible extent. Lest, it is compelled to make concessions—from a compromised position, one may add—to the United States; in which case the Iranian leadership must need to justify to its populace the new policy of reversing decades of demonizing rhetoric and active hostility towards the U.S., that made them pointlessly live under a wide array of sanctions for so long.
Simply put, if Russian support is completely lost at this critical juncture of world events; wherein great powers and alliance blocs are getting more and more paranoid of aggression and foreign threats; which, in rerum natura, may very well cultivate their hawkish proclivities; Iran has no other choice but to make a pact with its ‘designated Satan’ [emphasis added].
Saudi Arabia: The alpha-state of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the de facto leader of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), increasingly aware of its regional and global weight, and the leverage it entertains over global oil supply and, eo ipso, oil-price—that divine-class elixir that can still make the greatest of all nations drool—; with a resolved captain, Mohammed bin Salman, at the helm; embittered by condescending communications continually emitting from the White House; has recently shifted its pivot towards Russia.
Just days before Russia’s ‘special military operation’/invasion, President Biden asked the Saudis to boost oil production. It is important to note that, that wasn’t the first time the President of the United States has made this request. Nevertheless, it received no responsiveness on the part of the Saudi Crown Prince.
And, when President Biden vowed justice (i.e. accountability) for the assassination of Washington Post journalist, Khashoggi, and labelled the oil-rich country a “pariah,” “MBS [Mohammed bin Salman] told The Atlantic, “Simply, I do not care” if Biden misunderstands him, adding, “It’s up to him to think about the interests of America,”” (Reimann).
This stance on the part of MBS towards POTUS was merely the presage of the quasi re-alignment of Saudi Arabia that soon followed and broke its long-standing tradition of orbiting the United States. The erstwhile arrangement of passive acquiescence [emphasis added], with respect to Uncle Sam’s wishes, has lost its luster and no longer satisfied the ambitiously progressive young Saudi leader.
Instead, he seeks to rebrand his kingdom as a viable strategic partner on the world stage (especially within the sphere of international political economy) with interests of its own [emphasis added]; one that’s unimpressed with a mere seat, but demands, unflinchingly, a say at the table. In fine, MBS means business, not agency, in his orchestration of Saudi’s foreign policy.
Further signaling unswerving commitment to this newly-found hardline vis-á-vis a patronizing [emphasis added] U.S. administration, Mohammed bin Salman is holding talks with the Chinese—those could possibly conclude with Saudi accepting yuan-denominated payments for its oil sales to the latter—the result of which would be an inevitable demotion of U.S. dollar status, as the currency of choice for invoices, in the global petroleum market (Rosen).
As for other GCC members, it goes without saying that most of them (I am reserved not to say ‘all’, since Qatar violated that norm few years back) observe Saudi to be their Polaris (aka, the north or pole star) in matters of foreign policy. It is worth mentioning that the Gulf states abstained from voting against Russia in international venues—assuming a neutral position over the war in Ukraine—following Saudi’s suit. Namely one member, in particular, practically adopts (more so, mimics) Saudi foreign policy, that is the United Arab Emirates.
United Arab Emirates: Just 8 days ago, March 18, 2022, the UAE announced its reception of the once internationally-alienated (i.e. a persona non grata) Syrian President, Bashar Al-Assad. An explicit defiance of U.S. global directive of ‘nonrecognition’ as to the legitimacy of the Syrian President. Regardless, the Emiratis still received him as a head of state!
Obviously, the UAE has its own strategic considerations as well; those that simply transcend above remaining in the United States favor.
For starters, the United Arab Emirates is keen to formulate and implement a foreign (especially, regional) policy that falls in line with that of Saudi Arabia. Saudi is building rapport with Russia; and Syria is a key regional ally of the latter. A matter of simple mathematics. Other factors remain in play, however.
By bringing Syria back to the Arab fold, all the while a strategic partnership with Russia is in motion, the Gulf brethren aspire to contain and roll-back the Iranian led shiite alliance in the region. First Syria, then Iraq, and after that, Lebanon.
And, there’s more for the UAE with respect to Russia. The country’s economic interests have not yet been addressed. Since 2008, a substantial (and growing) Russian capital—billions and billions of U.S. dollars—have been inflowing and circulating in the UAE markets—most notably, in the Real Estate sector. Should the United Arab Emirates choose to expel Russian capital out of its markets, it would incidentally sabotage its phenomenal appeal to foreign investors.
Therefore, the UAE stands to gain a great deal on multiple accounts by following the suit of Saudi’s re-alignment.
Wrapping up with Syria: Syria stands, unequivocally, with Russia—its super-power ally and de facto ‘patron saint’. There were rumors circulating regarding Syria contributing military personnel to the Russian ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine, but there’s no credible intelligence to substantiate these speculations, as of yet.
In a nutshell, all indicators suggest that Russia scores better in the Middle-East region: retaining existing allies; forming new strategic partnerships; harnessing economic support; and, thereby, growing its influence over that turf. NOTWITHSTANDING, with the exception of Syria, all other alignments remain susceptible to the dictates of circumstance.
Reference
Hafezi, Parisa. “Iran’s Supreme Leader Criticises U.S. over Ukraine Crisis.” Reuters, 1 Mar. 2022, www.reuters.com/world/iran-supreme-leader-says-ukraine-is-victim-crises-caused-by-us-2022-03-01/. Accessed 21 Mar. 2022.
Reimann, Nicholas. Forbes, www.forbes.com/sites/nicholasreimann/2022/03/03/i-do-not-care-saudi-crown-prince-shrugs-off-concerns-from-biden-over-khashoggi-assassination/?sh=2082d6b7c28c&utm_source=ForbesMainTwitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=socialflowForbesMainTwitter. Accessed 25 Mar. 2022.
Rosen, Phil. “US Dollar’s Dominance in Oil Markets May Face Challenge As Saudis Reportedly Eye Yuan-based Sales Deal with China.” Markets Insider, 15 Mar. 2022, markets.businessinsider.com/news/currencies/us-dollar-vs-yuan-saudi-arabia-china-oil-sales-deal-2022-3?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=sf-bi-finance&utm_medium=social&fbclid=IwAR3w8j0NQRq9dm_fU7Bv_Tsl_abIjsMiIs3gNqBJS3z2OlF5_zkt1-UaWfc. Accessed 26 Mar. 2022.
