What I find most disconcerting at present, almost seven months into the war in Ukraine, is the popular oblivion to the actual peril and the stakes involved. To the rich and bored ‘bread and circus’ crowd, this is a war to be won with sarcastic memes and insolent tweets. And to the incumbent and manifestly incompetent political substrata in the West, endorsing and nurturing this kind of ignorance serves the purpose of keeping them in office. They are blatantly using the “Russia expense” account to write-off all their economic and political failures on the domestic balance-sheet. As a result, they have been conducting foreign policy as an article of domestic campaigning, rather than per strategic security and interests [emphasis added].
Whatever the case maybe, it’s always the Russians’ fault nowadays. “The Russians are getting it all wrong,” they say. “Accelerated inflation? Well, it wouldn’t have happened were it not for Russian imperial ambitions and warmongering.” “Someone cheated on his wife, or vice versa; they were inebriated on Russian vodka.” “Climate Change? The Russians are killing the planet with their overconsumption of vodka.” And you may expand the list with any idea that comes to your mind.
But none of this gibberish narrative is remotely incendiary—in terms of triggering a general war between the world’s great-powers, i.e. a World War—to any critical degree. Fortunately, an ounce of sanity yet abides in their skulls, as not to buy the utter bullshit they sell to the public. If the Russian army is truly this easily conquerable, then why hasn’t NATO stepped in thus far and neutralized the “Russian threat” once and for all?
Russia still has a colossal nuclear arsenal to be reckoned with, you may say. And you are, beyond a shadow of doubt, quite right!
On the other hand, nonetheless, some outspoken zealots in the West propound that Vladimir Putin was only bluffing, when he implied that Russia’s nuclear capability would be deployed should the West directly (declare war on Russia) interfere in Ukraine, promising them “consequences the world has never seen!”
Thus, should the West persist in these most imprudent and provocative foreign policy démarches towards Russia, the question on which the fate of the world hangs—and whether we’ll have to reset the calendar to year 1 P.A. (Post-Apocalypse)—will be: Was Putin making empty threats? Was he really bluffing?
Here again, we encounter a complete lack of understanding of the Russian character, on the part of the West. Unfortunately, in this particular instant, such lack of understanding may yield awfully cataclysmic consequences.
For the truth of the matter is this:
Let those with ears hearken to the truth; and, those of understanding, understand; for, verily verily I say unto you, Putin was not bluffing.
“What evidence do I have to substantiate my claim,” some skeptics may interject.
Well, the answer is manifold, but I shall attempt to lay it out succinctly in a holistic approach with respect to his character.
Consider the matter thus: ever since Putin rose to the pinnacle of power and led Russia out of the 1990s’ bezporiadok; ipso facto restoring the Russian people’s confidence in the grandiosity and competence of their state; the man became himself the living incarnation of Russia’s national pride and the walking figure of the state. In other words, namely in terms of power perception and projection, Putin is the voice and executing hand of Russia’s volition. As such, his success in mustering the requisite force and, more importantly, exerting it to make genuine retaliatory threats (i.e. a response) to an act of aggression against, or violation of the territorial integrity of, the Russian Federation; and, Russia’s potency to exercise her volition—like the great-power she is—in the international arena; are inseparable notions in the Russian popular mind.
Therefore, his failure to deliver on a promise of retaliation against aggression, let alone an act considered a declaration of war on Russia, would shake the very foundations of Russia’s status as great-power (nay, as a nuclear super-power with the world’s largest nuclear arsenal at her disposal, no less), and teeter the national sentiment between crippling fear and nihilism (i.e. nothingness). Indeed, this eventuality would constitute the single blow that would plunge Russia—as a conscious nation—into irremediable nihilism; a fortuity that neither Putin nor any sane Russian can tolerate in a pre-apocalyptic [emphasis added] world—for that is the literal manifestation of the apocalypse for Russia.
This should suffice to explain his inner restraints as to making empty threats of this magnitude, even on the most foolhardy impulse, as the figure of the state and the living symbol representing Russian pride; for that would place Russia in a most vulnerable position, wherein the stakes are inconceivably high. Losing the war itself wouldn’t inflict this calamitous damage on Russia’s international reputation and the domestic perception of the nation’s strength, as would calling out a bluff of this nature.
With respect to the Russian character, in general terms, consequential-accountability is ingrained so deeply in the Russian psyche, that hardly can one come across any sane Russian who genuinely believes he could get away with any action in real life without bearing the weight of its consequences. Russians don’t believe in external and fortuitous safety nets [emphasis added]. The only safety net the Russian mind perceives, is the one that a person’s abilities and strengths weave into being. Having that said, Russians would run the risk of bluffing in two cases: either where they are absolutely certain that they can withstand the fallouts thereof; or, when they are in a position that would allow them to successfully avert these fallouts altogether. And neither case applies to Putin’s threat of deploying Russia’s nuclear capability—in the occasion of Western intervention or that of violating Russia’s territorial integrity.
What good is a deterrent [emphasis added] if it doesn’t deter or make an example of the transgressor?
Now that his willingness to circumstantially use Russian nukes has been attested on grounds of behavioral logic and common sense, to the question: Is it in his power to use them, nevertheless?
Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, tweeted the following on the fifth day of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict:
To elucidate the matter further, there’s a popular saying in Syria that goes: “Don’t draw your gun unless you’re willing to fire it; lest the day would come where someone would snatch it from your grip and shove it up your,” well, “ass”. And, I firmly believe that Putin is more serious than the average Syrian or Russian.
In fine, It is in the United States and Europe’s best strategic interest that Russia shouldn’t “lose” in Ukraine—equally so, that they should refrain from getting directly involved in that war—for that would surely render a thermonuclear war inevitable.
Related publication: “Sleepwalking back to 1914: A State of Imminent Danger of War?” And, “Ukraine Crisis [Part IV: A Message to the Few Buggers Dancing to the Drumbeats of World War III and Hailing the Prospects of a Thermonuclear Warfare]”
